Freedom is an illusion

Freedom is an illusionBrief 106213Freedom is an illusion. Discuss.Roger Scruton at one time remarked that there atomic number 18 two sources of the meta physiological conundrum of valet de chambre existence one is consciousness, the former(a) one is independence. (Scruton 227). Philosophers feature long been perplexed by call into questions of savedom and essential in sympathetic animation. This essay leave focus on paradise philosophy which has given a formidable response to those who maintained that independence in the social domain is a chimera. Amongst Enlightenment philosophers Im small-armuel Kant has probably theorise the most consistent and compelling argument for the existence of hu mankind freedom and it is his apprehension of the intricate connection betwixt liberty and autonomy that will receive most attention in this essay.Philosophers have often approached the have it off of human freedom from two different angles. First, they often conceptualised free dom low the rubrics of the absence or presence of constraints in the social sphere. Political philosophers have mainly engaged in this version of theorising freedom. The question they asked is most poignantly captured by Rousseau who nones that the real mystery of freedom is how we can be in chains and still regard ourselves as free (Rousseau 181).While doubting Thomas Hobbes considered freedom a matter of external impediments to an intended arrangeion, Rousseau extended this radicall of impediment by querying whether social pr exploitices and laws should consequently be perceived as constraints and how we could possibly justify the existence of much(prenominal) laws and rules. Rousseau accepted that rules may assuage the varied co-operative schemes amongst strangers. Yet, he argued whatever laws of society clearly required few justification, one that was rooted not in tradition but in reason. He writesthe problem is to find a form of association in which each individual, era uniting himself with every, may still obey himself alone, and anticipate as free as before. (Rousseau 191)The second, and arguably more philosophical scene which philosophers formulated however takes a more fundamental view of human life. It does not concentrate on the various external constraints which may act as obstacles in our multifarious pursuits of life, but whether we have the capacity to act freely at all.David Hume framed this viewpoint when he explored the relationship between reason, passion and movement in his work A Treatise of Human Nature. In an insightful passage he notes that reason may be instrumental in identifying the connections between causes and effects, but essential inevitably fail to endure to the objects of our will. He thereby sets the tone of the argument which Immanuel Kant took up scarce decades afterward with such analytic precision. Hume notesNothing can oppose or moron the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulseWe speak not stric tly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought solely to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any early(a) office than to serve and obey them. (Hume 415)And in a famous sentence, Hume draws the group conclusionTis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the unharmed world to the scratching of my finger. (Hume 416)But if Humes radical scepticism as to the influence of reason on individual volition was correct, ar we condemned to go wherever our passions and impulses take us? Kant was at pains to point come forth that human life possesses an honourable quality which cannot be grounded in the procreate desires and urges that individuals happen to find themselves in. Any viable notion of moral manners must(prenominal) presuppose a capacity to reason and, critically, assumes a notion of freedom that we cannot deny anybody else. Freedom is a prerequisite of ethical behaviour. Kant model that Hume ha d overlooked an essential dimension of the relationship between passions and human action. Although he granted that desires and impulses that are contingent upon circumstances may generate the goals of human conduct whether or not we pursue a once set object of desire or a certain course of action crucially depends on its compatibility with the most fundamental moral law, the categorical imperative, which is the rule to act on no other saw than that which can to a fault have as an object itself as a universal law. (Kant 63)This leads Kant to shut that freedom is the most fundamental category of social existence for those that are capable of rationality. As Scruton notes, for Kant freedom is the presupposition for the applicability of the moral law (Scruton 234). However, if this was all there is to Kants argument he would only have presented us with another reason why we ought to assume that individuals act freely when they dissemble morally.First of all, Kant reminds us that as humans we are at once part of the world of nature and of the world of reason. As to our impulses and desires that we happen to have, we are part of the animal world. We understand them in terms of necessity, generated by physical circumstances. No moral standards apply. It matters little whether we approve of being hungry or sleepy ethical maxims cannot alter our state of affairs in any strange way. As such, human beings are subject to the natural laws that sway the domain of nature. We cannot suspend these laws even if we disapprove of them.On the other hand, however, man is a creature that is capable of rational thought and as such he has given himself laws to live by. These laws are often arbitrary, but Kant intends to show that there is at least one law that regulates human life which possesses universal applicability. The issue Kant has to confront is one that echoes Rousseaus dilemma of how to lenify laws and freedom. For Kant, his question is under which conditions ind ividual agency can impose norms and rules onto itself while still remaining to be unfettered by extraneous circumstances. For Rousseau it was the question of identifying those laws of society that would accommodate individual (external) freedom with legal constraints.Kant challenges us premier of all to consider under which conditions we can speak of a free will. He argues that human volition must be self-determined to be in all likelihood considered as free. If the will is subject to extraneous circumstances or influences if ceases to let loose itself freely in our actions. In this scheme of things, freedom can only be preserved if the moral laws that individuals endorse and accept as their counselling are such that they can accept them voluntarily (Kant 57-58).Kant notes that man may come to approve of various rules of social co-operation for a variety of reasons, many of them ethically more obscure than others. What may appear to be actions make out of benevolence may turn out to be do with a personal benefit in mind. Kant is adamant that we cannot accept any rules for spurious or ethically nebulous reasons. Accepting a maxim out of selfishness does not produce a goodish, but a morally flawed norm. Equally, adopting a morally hazy rule even with best(p) intentions cannot lay the foundations of a just society.In a brilliant analytical sequence Kant guides us to the solution of this problem The only truly good entity, he argues, is a good will (Kant 14-15). It is only determined by itself and so accepts no other authority than itself. In fact, it produces true legitimacy of human conduct. Now, any inherently good will must distinguish that there is only one maxim that reflects accurately the notion of an ethical norm Kant writesAct only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. (Kant 38)Kants argument provides us with a formidable justification for assuming that freedom is the necessary and indisp ensable condition of human existence given that man has the capacity to act upon the commands of reason that is the categorical imperative. He writesNow I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. (The individual) must regard itself as the author of its principles independent on foreign influences. Consequently, any individual must regard itself as free. (Kant 65)For Kant, being human is tantamount to being free. alone freedom guarantees that we can plausibly speak about moral responsibility. And although Kants argument in favour of the categorical imperative has attracted much criticism, his idea of freedom and individual autonomy still offers us a remarkable benchmark in normative ethical theory.David Hume (1989). A Treatise of Human Nature. 1739. redact by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford Clarendon.Immanuel Kant (1949). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785. Indiana polis New York Liberal Arts Press.Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973). The favorable Contract and Discourses. 1762 Translated and introduced by G.D.H. Cole. London Everyman.Roger Scruton (1997). Modern Philosophy. A Survey. London Arrow.